Европейский суд по правам человека
25 марта 1999 года
Facts
After a criminal investigation the applicants were committed to stand trial on charges of criminal bankruptcy. That court acquitted them in 1991, finding that they had not acted as managers. In a judgment delivered in 1992 the Court of Appeal upheld that finding but convicted them of aiding and abetting criminal bankruptcy instead. It sentenced them to a suspended term of 18 months’ imprisonment and imposed a FRF 30 000 fine. The applicants’ appeal to the Court of Cassation was dismissed.
Complaint
The applicants complained that the Court of Appeal had decided in deliberations to convict them of aiding and abetting criminal bankruptcy, which was not the offence charged, without hearing argument from the parties on the issue. They complained, too, of the length of the proceedings. They relied on Article 6 of the Convention.
Court’s ruling
The Court noted that the Criminal Code as applicable at the material time expressly provided that aiding and abetting could be made out only on proof of a number of special elements, subject to strict, cumulative conditions. The Court could not, therefore, accept the Government’s submission that aiding and abetting differed from the principal offence only as to the degree of participation. The Court noted that it was plausible that the defence would have been different from the defence to the substantive charge.
The Court found that the applicants had been given no opportunity to prepare their defence to the new charge, as it was only through the Court of Appeal’s judgment that they had become aware of the recharacterisation of the facts. The Court concluded that the applicants’ right to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against them and their right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of their defence had been infringed. Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 6.
The Court noted that the period to be taken into consideration in determining whether the proceedings satisfied the “reasonable length” requirement laid down by Article 6 had begun when the applicants were charged and ended with the judgment of the Court of Cassation. Consequently, the proceedings had lasted 9 years and 5 months in the case of the first applicant and 8 years, 8 months and 2 days in the case of the second applicant. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings was to be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case, regard being had to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, particularly the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and the conduct of the competent authorities. In the case before it, the Court found that the length of the proceedings could not be justified by the complexity of the case and that there was nothing to suggest that the applicants had been responsible for the delays in the proceedings. The Court also considered that there had been unjustified delays and periods of inactivity during the investigation, which were attributable to the national authorities. Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 6 (1).